US and Israeli media and politicians often speak as if Hamas carried out an unprovoked attack on October 7, which started the current round of hostilities. The reasoning goes that since Hamas started this round, it is responsible for its consequences, no matter how horrible. Israeli actions are seen as a “response,” and we are often asked, “How else should Israel have responded? What would you have them do?” But we first must ask: what was the situation on October 6? On October 6, Gaza, a small area about 22 miles long and between 5 and 8 miles wide, was packed with 2.3 million Palestinians, two-thirds of whom were refugees and survivors of the 1948 Nakba. Israel was imposing a severe siege on the whole strip (with cooperation from Egypt on the southern border) whereby no people or goods could enter or leave the strip without Israeli approval.
Israel had managed to continue the occupation of Gaza after it withdrew its settlers in 2005, without being physically “on the ground,” except for occasional forays. It controlled the area from the air, sea, and by managing all entrances. This situation mirrored the West Bank, where Israel is still the occupier, but where it has subcontracted internal affairs of the major city centers to the Palestinian Authority, under severe restriction. So too had Israel “subcontracted” internal control of Gaza to Hamas while maintaining external control, frequently invading the area with bombardment and “mowing the lawn” operations. On October 6, Israel continued to dominate the Gaza strip, with its currency, population register, customs controls, and regime of restrictions. Postal, communications, internet, and fuel services were also strictly under Israel’s control. It doled out permits for all services into and out of Gaza including fuel, medical supplies, entry and export of food materials, and all other needed goods and services through a system of extortionist Israeli middlemen. The short list of goods that Israel permitted to enter Gaza excluded not only “dual function goods” that could serve military as well as civilian uses (such as steel bars and cement), but also innocuous materials such as glass, chocolate, all but one form of pasta and spaghetti, etc. Often the list showed caprice and nastiness, and it seemed to have no logic behind it other than Israel’s desire to assert power and control. Fishing, which the Oslo Agreement allowed up to 12 miles out, was also strictly restricted, usually to 6 or 3 miles, and it was often banned altogether.
The de-development of the Gaza strip was so severe that most of its residents were dependent on relief and supplies from UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency), whose supplies were also carefully monitored and often delayed or restricted at Israel’s whim. It was commonly known that Gaza was the world’s largest open-air prison, and in 2012 the United Nations announced that Gaza would be unlivable by 2020. For its part, Hamas tried to join a political process. It changed its charter to be more moderate, announced repeatedly that it would be willing to accept a long-term “hudna” (ceasefire) with Israel, and expressed openness to accept a two-state solution accepted by the majority of Palestinians in an open election. It also supported the brave civil society initiative known as the March of Return, a nonviolent action that was met with brutal savagery as Israeli snipers killed and maimed hundreds of unarmed Palestinian protesters while the world stood silently by.
Attempts were also made to create a joint Fatah-Hamas front and to end the divisions preventing Palestinians from negotiating with one voice, but these efforts failed. Both Hamas and Fatah blamed each other for this, but the US and Israel made it clear they would not allow an end to the schism. Netanyahu openly told Mahmoud Abbas that there would be no relations and negotiations with them, if they made peace with Hamas. As if all this was not enough, Netanyahu was continuously tightening the noose, placing more and more restrictions on Gaza, such as limiting the availability of electricity to a few hours a day through controlling the amount of fuel allowed into its one electricity company. The Israeli government, dominated by right wing parties was also busy with its own problems from the corruption charges, to the unprecedented street protests, and was also infected with enormous hubris regarding its economic, political, and military superiority over its neighbors. It was not in any mood to offer anything but more restrictions to the people of Gaza. The Gaza strip was a pressure cooker, so it was no surprise that, eventually, it exploded. To understand what happened on October 7, we need to be cognizant of the reality that existed in Gaza on October 6. The prison camp of Gaza was totally unlivable and unacceptable, and it had to end. The world, however, including those concerned with peace and justice, had somehow forgotten about Gaza and neglected its people. There is much to criticize about Hamas, but one cannot blame them for preparing to fight their enemies and tormentors, or for attempting to break out of their open-air prison. On October 6, the situation in Gaza was truly degrading and intolerable, and the world seemed not to listen or care. Something had to be done to bring the plight of Gaza back into consideration, and October 7 was Hamas’ answer. In many ways, it was inevitable. Jonathan Kuttab, FOSNA Executive Director P.S. Please join the Every Life, A Universe Days of Remembrance by wearing black ribbons/arm bands and attending 3 days of events, whether online or locally organized vigils, memorials, or demonstrations. |
